{"id":2298,"date":"2017-09-28T05:00:53","date_gmt":"2017-09-28T05:00:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.inforsec.org\/wp\/?p=2298"},"modified":"2017-09-28T05:02:38","modified_gmt":"2017-09-28T05:02:38","slug":"sgx-%e4%be%a7%e4%bf%a1%e9%81%93%e6%94%bb%e5%87%bb%e7%bb%bc%e8%bf%b0","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/202.112.238.40\/wp\/?p=2298","title":{"rendered":"SGX \u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u7efc\u8ff0"},"content":{"rendered":"

 <\/p>\n

\u4f5c\u8005\uff1a\u7a0b\u8d8a\u5f3a\u00a0 \u00a0 \u767e\u5ea6\u7f8e\u56fd\u7814\u7a76\u9662\u5b89\u5168\u5b9e\u9a8c\u5ba4\u7684\u8d44\u6df1\u5b89\u5168\u79d1\u5b66\u5bb6<\/p>\n

Intel SGX \u6280\u672f\u662f\u4e00\u79cd\u65b0\u7684\u57fa\u4e8e\u786c\u4ef6\u7684\u53ef\u4fe1\u8ba1\u7b97\u6280\u672f\u3002\u8be5\u6280\u672f\u901a\u8fc7CPU\u7684\u5b89\u5168\u6269\u5c55\uff0c\u5bf9\u7528\u6237\u7a7a\u95f4\u8fd0\u884c\u73af\u5883\uff08enclave\uff09\u63d0\u4f9b\u673a\u5bc6\u6027\u548c\u5b8c\u6574\u6027\u4fdd\u62a4\u3002\u5373\u4f7f\u662f\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u83b7\u5f97OS\uff0chypervisor\uff0cBIOS \u548cSMM \u7b49\u6743\u9650\uff0c\u4e5f\u65e0\u6cd5\u76f4\u63a5\u653b\u51fbenclave\u3002\u56e0\u6b64\uff0c\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u4e0d\u5f97\u4e0d\u901a\u8fc7\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u7684\u653b\u51fb\u65b9\u6cd5\u6765\u95f4\u63a5\u83b7\u53d6\u6570\u636e\uff08\u6bd4\u5982\u9690\u79c1\u6570\u636e\uff0c\u52a0\u5bc6\u5bc6\u94a5\u7b49\u7b49\uff09\u3002\u5f97\u76ca\u4e8eenclave \u7684\u5f3a\u5b89\u5168\u5047\u8bbe\u548c\u5de5\u4f5c\u6a21\u578b\uff0c\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u6709\u5927\u91cf\u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u9762\u53ef\u4ee5\u9009\u62e9\uff0c\u6bd4\u5982\u9875\u8868\uff0ccache\uff0cDRAM \u7b49\u7b49\u3002\u8fd9\u4e2a\u5de5\u4f5c\u5c31\u662f\u5bf9\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u9762\u8fdb\u884c\u4e00\u4e2a\u5168\u9762\u7684\u603b\u7ed3\uff0c\u5e76\u8ba8\u8bba\u4e00\u4e9b\u53ef\u80fd\u7684\u9632\u5fa1\u548c\u68c0\u6d4b\u65b9\u6cd5\u3002<\/p>\n

1 \u5f15\u8a00<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u5f53\u6211\u4eec\u4e0d\u80fd\u591f\u5b8c\u5168\u76f8\u4fe1\u67d0\u4e2a\u8ba1\u7b97\u5e73\u53f0\uff08\u6bd4\u5982\u516c\u6709\u4e91\u548c\u53ef\u80fd\u88ab\u653b\u7834\u7684\u64cd\u4f5c\u7cfb\u7edf\uff09\u7684\u65f6\u5019\uff0c\u5efa\u7acb\u4e2a\u53ef\u4fe1\u7684\u8fd0\u884c\u73af\u5883\uff08TEE\uff09\u662f\u4e00\u4e2a\u975e\u5e38\u91cd\u8981\u7684\u5b89\u5168\u8981\u6c42\u3002\u8fd1\u4e9b\u5e74\u7814\u7a76\u4eba\u5458\u63d0\u51fa\u4e86\u5f88\u591aTEE \u7cfb\u7edf\u7528\u4e8e\u4fdd\u62a4\u5e94\u7528\u7a0b\u5e8f\uff0c\u4f7f\u5176\u80fd\u591f\u62b5\u5fa1\u6765\u81ea\u64cd\u4f5c\u7cfb\u7edf\u7684\u653b\u51fb[5, 6, 12]\u3002\u4e3a\u4e86\u9632\u5fa1\u66f4\u5f3a\u7684\u653b\u51fb\uff0c\u6bd4\u5982\u6765\u81eahypervisor \u6216SMM \u7684\u653b\u51fb\uff0cIntel\u57282013 \u5e74HASP\u4f1a\u8bae\u7684workshop\u6b63\u5f0f\u63a8\u51fa\u4e86Intel SGX\u3002\u8be5\u6280\u672f\u901a\u8fc7CPU \u7684\u5b89\u5168\u6269\u5c55\uff0c\u5bf9\u7528\u6237\u7a7a\u95f4\u8fd0\u884c\u73af\u5883\uff08enclave\uff09\u63d0\u4f9b\u57fa\u4e8e\u786c\u4ef6\uff08CPU\uff09\u7684\u4fdd\u62a4\u3002\u5373\u4f7f\u662f\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u83b7\u5f97\u4e86OS\uff0chypervisor\uff0cBIOS\uff0cSMM \u7b49\u6743\u9650\uff0c\u4e5f\u65e0\u6cd5\u76f4\u63a5\u8bfb\u53d6\u6216\u8005\u4fee\u6539enclave \u7684\u5185\u5bb9\u3002<\/p>\n

Enclave \u7684\u8fd0\u884c\u73af\u5883\u6709\u5927\u91cf\u7684\u8d44\u6e90\u548c\u5916\u9762non-enclave \u516c\u7528\uff0c\u6bd4\u5982cache\uff0c\u9875\u8868\uff0cDRAM \u548c\u5206\u652f\u9884\u6d4b\u5668\u7b49\uff0c\u8fd9\u5c31\u7ed9\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u63d0\u4f9b\u4e86\u4e30\u5bcc\u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u9762\u3002\u800c\u4e14\uff0c\u4e0d\u53ef\u4fe1\u7684\u64cd\u4f5c\u7cfb\u7edf\u8fd8\u4ecd\u7136\u8d1f\u8d23\u7ba1\u7406\u7cfb\u7edf\u7684\u8d44\u6e90\uff0c\u6bd4\u5982\u9875\u8868\uff0c\u5185\u5b58\uff0c\u4e2d\u65ad\uff0c\u8fdb\u7a0b\u8c03\u5ea6\u7b49\u7b49\uff0c\u8fd9\u5c31\u8fdb\u4e00\u6b65\u65b9\u4fbf\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u51cf\u5c0f\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u8fc7\u7a0b\u4e2d\u7684\u566a\u97f3\uff0c\u4ece\u800c\u63d0\u9ad8\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u7684\u6210\u529f\u7387\u3002<\/p>\n

\u672c\u6587\u4e3b\u8981\u8c03\u7814\u548c\u603b\u7ed3\u76ee\u524d\u5df2\u6709\u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u3002\u6839\u636e\u653b\u51fb\u9762\u7684\u4e0d\u540c\uff0c\u6211\u4eec\u5c06\u4ece\u9875\u8868\uff0cTLB\uff0ccache\uff0cDRAM \u548c\u5206\u652f\u9884\u6d4b\u5668\u7b49\u51e0\u4e2a\u9762\u8fdb\u884c\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u7684\u4ecb\u7ecd\u3002SGX \u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u5341\u5206\u96be\u4ee5\u9632\u5fa1\u3002\u76ee\u524d\u8fd8\u6ca1\u6709\u4e00\u79cd\u9632\u5fa1\u7b56\u7565\u53ef\u4ee5\u9632\u5fa1\u4ee5\u4e0a\u6240\u6709\u653b\u51fb\u3002\u672c\u6587\u6700\u540e\u5bf9\u53ef\u80fd\u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u9632\u5fa1\u653b\u51fb\u65b9\u6cd5\u8fdb\u884c\u7b80\u8981\u7684\u603b\u7ed3\uff0c\u5e0c\u671b\u8bfb\u8005\u80fd\u591f\u5728\u67d0\u4e9b\u65b9\u9762\u53d7\u5230\u542f\u53d1\u3002<\/p>\n

2 SGX \u80cc\u666f\u4ecb\u7ecd<\/strong><\/p>\n

Intel SGX \u662f\u4e00\u79cd\u57fa\u4e8e\u786c\u4ef6\u7684TEE\u7cfb\u7edf\u3002\u8be5\u529f\u80fd\u5df2\u7ecf\u96c6\u6210\u5728Intel Sky-Lake \u7cfb\u5217\u3002\u533a\u522b\u4ee5\u5f80\u7684TEE \u7cfb\u7edf\u6709\u7740\u8f83\u5927\u7684\u53ef\u4fe1\u8ba1\u7b97\u57fa\uff08TCB\uff09\uff0cSGX \u7684\u53ef\u4fe1\u8ba1\u7b97\u57fa\u975e\u5e38\u5c0f\uff0c\u4ec5\u4ec5\u5305\u542bCPU \u548cenclave \u672c\u8eab\u3002\u4efb\u4f55\u7684\u7279\u6743\u8f6f\u4ef6\uff0c\u6bd4\u5982OS\uff0chypervisor\uff0cBIOS\uff0cSMM \u7b49\u90fd\u4e0d\u5305\u542b\u5728\u53ef\u4fe1\u8ba1\u7b97\u57fa\u5185\u3002Enclave\u6709SGX \u786c\u4ef6\u4e13\u95e8\u9884\u7559\u7684EPC\uff08Enclave Page Cache\uff09\u5185\u5b58\u3002EPC\u662fPRM\uff08processor reserved memory\uff09\u7684\u5b50\u96c6\uff0c\u5e76\u88ab\u7cfb\u7edf\u8f6f\u4ef6\u6309\u71674KB\u7c92\u5ea6\u8fdb\u884c\u5206\u9875\u7ba1\u7406\u3002\u6bcf\u4e00\u4e2aEPC \u9875\u9762\u53ea\u80fd\u5206\u914d\u7ed9\u4e00\u4e2aenclave\u3002CPU \u963b\u6b62\u4efb\u4f55non-enclave \u53bb\u8bbf\u95eePRM\uff0c\u4efb\u4f55non-enclave \u7684\u8bbf\u95ee\u90fd\u4f1a\u5bfc\u81f4\u4e00\u4e2a\u5931\u8d25\u7684\u4e8b\u52a1\uff08aborted transaction\uff09\u3002\u5728\u76ee\u524dSkyLake \u7684\u5904\u7406\u5668\u4e0a\u9762\uff0c\u5931\u8d25\u7684\u5199\u64cd\u4f5c\u88ab\u5ffd\u7565\uff0c\u5931\u8d25\u7684\u8bfb\u64cd\u4f5c\u76f4\u63a5\u8fd4\u56de\u4e00\u4e2a\u51681\u7684\u503c\u3002<\/p>\n

\u6bcf\u4e2aenclave \u7684\u7a0b\u5e8f\u6307\u5b9a\u4e00\u6bb5ELRANGE\uff08Enclave Linear AddressRange\uff09\u7684\u865a\u62df\u7a7a\u95f4\u4f9b\u81ea\u8eab\u8fd0\u884c\u3002\u9875\u8868\u8d1f\u8d23\u628a\u865a\u62df\u5730\u5740\u6620\u5c04\u4e3aEPC\u6240\u5728\u7684\u7269\u7406\u5730\u5740\u3002\u9875\u8868\u7684\u5de5\u4f5c\u539f\u7406\u548c\u4ee5\u5f80\u7684\u9875\u8868\u4e00\u6837\uff0c\u6bd4\u5982\u4f1a\u8fdb\u884c\u6743\u9650\u7684\u68c0\u6d4b\u3001\u4f1a\u8bbe\u7f6eaccess bit\u548cdirty bit\u7b49\u7b49\u3002Enclave \u548cnon-enclave \u53ef\u4ee5\u901a\u8fc7EENTER \u548cEEXIT \u6765\u4e3b\u52a8\u5207\u6362\u5de5\u4f5c\u6a21\u5f0f\u3002Enclave \u8fd0\u884c\u65f6\u53ef\u80fd\u4f1a\u88ab\u4e2d\u65ad\u6216\u8005\u5f02\u5e38\u6253\u65ad\uff0c\u8fd9\u4e2a\u65f6\u5019enclave \u4f1a\u901a\u8fc7AEX\uff08Asynchronous EnclaveExit\uff09\u673a\u5236\u9000\u51fa\uff0c\u5207\u6362\u5230non-enclave\u5de5\u4f5c\u6a21\u5f0f\u3002\u5728\u6a21\u5f0f\u5207\u6362\u8fc7\u7a0b\u4e2d\uff0c\u8fd0\u884c\u72b6\u6001\u4f1a\u4fdd\u5b58\u5230SSA\u7ed3\u6784\u4f53\uff08State Save Area \uff09\u91cc\u9762\uff0c\u540c\u65f6\u6e05\u9664TLB\u4ee5\u4fdd\u8bc1enclave \u7684\u5b89\u5168\u3002<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

\u56fe1: Intel SGX \u5185\u5b58\u5206\u5e03\u548c\u9694\u79bb\u673a\u5236\u3002Enclave \u8dd1\u5728EPC \u4e0a\u9762\u3002Enclave\u7684\u6570\u636e\u4ec5\u53ef\u4ee5\u88abenclave \u81ea\u5df1\u8bbf\u95ee\uff0c\u4efb\u4f55\u5916\u754c\u4ee3\u7801\u7684\u8bbf\u95ee\u90fd\u4f1a\u88ab\u62d2\u7edd\u3002<\/p>\n

3 SGX \u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u672c\u7ae0\u91cd\u70b9\u4ecb\u7ecdSGX \u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u3002\u9996\u5148\u4ecb\u7ecdSGX\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u7684\u5a01\u80c1\u6a21\u578b\uff0c\u7136\u540e\u6982\u62ec\u4ecb\u7ecd\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u7684\u653b\u51fb\u9762\u3002\u6700\u540e\uff0c\u6839\u636e\u653b\u51fb\u9762\u7684\u4e0d\u540c\uff0c\u518d\u5206\u522b\u4ecb\u7ecd\u4e00\u4e0b\u76ee\u524d\u5df2\u7ecf\u53d1\u8868\u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u3002<\/p>\n

3.1 \u5a01\u80c1\u6a21\u578b<\/p>\n

\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u4e3b\u8981\u76ee\u6807\u662f\u653b\u51fbenclave\u6570\u636e\u7684\u673a\u5bc6\u6027\uff08confidentiality\uff09\u3002\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u6765\u81eanon-enclave \u90e8\u5206\uff0c\u5305\u62ec\u5e94\u7528\u7a0b\u5e8f\u548c\u7cfb\u7edf\u8f6f\u4ef6\u3002\u7cfb\u7edf\u8f6f\u4ef6\u5305\u62ecOS\uff0chypervisor\uff0cSMM\uff0cBIOS \u7b49\u7279\u6743\u7ea7\u8f6f\u4ef6\u3002<\/p>\n

\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u4e00\u822c\u5047\u8bbe\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u77e5\u9053enclave \u521d\u59cb\u5316\u65f6\u5019\u7684\u4ee3\u7801\u548c\u6570\u636e\uff0c\u5e76\u4e14\u77e5\u9053\u5185\u5b58\u5e03\u5c40\u3002\u5185\u5b58\u5e03\u5c40\u5305\u62ec\u865a\u62df\u5730\u5740\uff0c\u7269\u7406\u5730\u5740\u4ee5\u53ca\u4ed6\u4eec\u4e4b\u95f4\u7684\u6620\u5c04\u5173\u7cfb\u3002\u6709\u4e9b\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u5047\u8bbe\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u77e5\u9053enclave \u7684\u8f93?\u6570\u636e\uff0c\u5e76\u4e14\u53ef\u4ee5\u53cd\u590d\u89e6\u53d1enclave\uff0c\u8fdb\u884c\u591a\u6b21\u89c2\u5bdf\u8bb0\u5f55\u3002\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u8fd8\u5047\u8bbe\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u77e5\u9053\u8fd0\u884cenclave \u5e73\u53f0\u7684\u786c\u4ef6\u914d\u7f6e\u3001\u7279\u6027\u548c\u6027\u80fd\uff0c\u6bd4\u5982CPU\uff0cTLB\uff0ccache\uff0cDRAM\uff0c\u9875\u8868\uff0c\u4e2d\u65ad\u4ee5\u53ca\u5f02\u5e38\u7b49\u5404\u79cd\u7cfb\u7edf\u5e95\u5c42\u673a\u5236\u3002<\/p>\n

3.2 \u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u7684\u653b\u51fb\u9762<\/p>\n

enclave \u548cnon-enclave\u5171\u4eab\u5927\u91cf\u7684\u7cfb\u7edf\u8d44\u6e90\uff0c\u8fd9\u5c31\u7ed9\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u7559\u4e0b\u4e86\u975e\u5e38\u5927\u7684\u653b\u51fb\u9762\u3002\u7ecf\u8fc7\u5bf9\u73b0\u6709\u8d44\u6599\u7684\u603b\u7ed3\u548c\u7cfb\u7edf\u7ed3\u6784\u7684\u5206\u6790\uff0c\u6211\u4eec\u628aSGX\u7684\u653b\u51fb\u603b\u7ed3\u5728\u56fe2\u91cc\u9762\u3002<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

\u56fe2: Intel SGX \u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u7684\u653b\u51fb\u9762\u3002<\/p>\n

\u5982\u56fe2\u6240\u793a\uff0cenclave \u7684\u8fd0\u884c\u8fc7\u7a0b\u4e2d\u4f1a\u7528\u5230<\/p>\n

1. CPU \u5185\u90e8\u7ed3\u6784\u3002\u6bd4\u5982pipeline\uff0cbranch prediction Buffer\uff08BPB\uff09\u7b49\u7b49\u3002\u8fd9\u4e9b\u7ed3\u6784\u4e0d\u80fd\u591f\u76f4\u63a5\u8bbf\u95ee\uff0c\u4f46\u662f\u5982\u679c\u53ef\u4ee5\u95f4\u63a5\u5229\u7528[16]\uff0c\u4ecd\u7136\u53ef\u80fd\u6cc4\u9732enclave\u7684\u63a7\u5236\u6d41\u6216\u6570\u636e\u6d41\u3002<\/p>\n

2. TLB\u3002TLB \u6709\u5305\u62eciTLB\uff0cdTLB \u548cL2 TLB\u3002\u5982\u679cHyperThreading\u6253\u5f00\uff0c\u4e24\u4e2a\u903b\u8f91\u6838\u5171\u4eab\u4e00\u4e2a\u7269\u7406\u6838\uff0c\u8fd9\u4e2a\u65f6\u5019\u4f1a\u5927\u5927\u589e\u52a0\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u7684\u53ef\u80fd\u3002<\/p>\n

3. Cache\u3002Cache \u5305\u62ecL1 instruction cache\uff0cL1 data cache\uff0cL2cache \u548cL3 cache\uff08\u53c8\u53ebLLC cache\uff09\u3002<\/p>\n

4. DRAM\u3002DRAM \u5305\u542bchannels\uff0cDIMMs\uff0cranks\uff0cbanks\u3002\u6bcf\u4e2abanks\u53c8\u5305\u542brows\u3001columns \u548crow buffer\u3002<\/p>\n

5. Pagetable\uff08\u9875\u8868\uff09\u3002\u9875\u8868\u53ef\u4ee5\u901a\u8fc7\u6743\u9650\u63a7\u5236\u6765\u89e6\u53d1\u7f3a\u9875\u5f02\u5e38\uff0c\u4e5f\u53ef\u4ee5\u901a\u8fc7\u9875\u8868\u7684\u72b6\u6001\u4f4d\u6765\u8868\u660eCPU \u7684\u67d0\u4e9b\u64cd\u4f5c\u3002\u5bf9\u4e8e\u4e0d\u540c\u7684\u653b\u51fb\u9762\uff0c\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u9700\u8981\u4e86\u89e3\u5177\u4f53\u7684\u7ec6\u8282\u548c\u5de5\u4f5c\u539f\u7406\u3002\u5176\u4e2d\u6bd4\u8f83\u91cd\u8981\u7684\u53c2\u8003\u7684\u6587\u6863\u5c31\u662fIntel \u7684\u624b\u518c[14, 13]\u3002\u76ee\u524dSGX \u5df2\u7ecf\u90e8\u7f72\u5728SkyLake \u7684\u673a\u5668\u4e0a\u9762\u3002\u56e0\u6b64\u6211\u4eec\u9700\u8981\u5bf9SkyLake \u7684\u4e00\u4e9b\u786c\u4ef6\u548c\u6027\u80fd\u7ec6\u8282\u91cd\u70b9\u638c\u63e1\u3002\u6587\u6863[2]\u5bf9SkyLake i7-6700 \u7684\u4e00\u4e9bCPU \u7ec6\u8282\u548c\u6027\u80fd\u505a\u4e86\u4e00\u4e2a\u6bd4\u8f83\u5168\u9762\u7684\u4ecb\u7ecd\u548c\u6d4b\u91cf\u3002<\/p>\n

\u76ee\u524d\uff0c\u6587\u7ae0[28]\u53d1\u73b0\u4e86Intel\u6587\u6863\u7684\u4e00\u5904\u63cf\u8ff0\u548c\u5b9e\u9645\u5b9e\u9a8c\u6709\u51b2\u7a81\uff0c\u5728\u8fd9\u91cc\u9700\u8981\u91cd\u70b9\u8bf4\u660e\u4e00\u4e0b\u3002\u5177\u4f53\u6765\u8bb2Intel \u6587\u6863[13] \u6307\u51faSkyLake\u673a\u5668\uff0c\u5728\u6253\u5f00hyperthreading\u4e4b\u540e\u7684TLB\u7684\u914d\u7f6e\u4fe1\u606f\u5982\u56fe3\u3002\u7136\u800c\uff0c\u6839\u636e\u6587\u7ae0[28]\u7684\u5b9e\u9a8c\uff0c\u8fd9\u4e2aIntel \u6587\u6863\u5bf9\u4e8eTLB partition \u7684\u63cf\u8ff0\u662f\u4e0d\u51c6\u786e\u7684\u3002\u5b9e\u9a8c\u7ed3\u679c\u8868\u660e\uff0ciTLB \u662ffixed partition\uff0c\u5176\u4ed6(dTLB \u548cL2 TLB\uff09\u90fd\u662fdynamicpartition\u3002\u672c\u6587\u5c1a\u672a\u5b9e\u9a8c\u9a8c\u8bc1\u4e0a\u8ff0\u5b9e\u9a8c\u7ed3\u679c\u3002\u5982\u679c\u5927\u5bb6\u7528\u5230\u8fd9\u90e8\u5206\u77e5\u8bc6\uff0c\u8fd8\u9700\u72ec\u7acb\u5b9e\u9a8c\u9a8c\u8bc1\u3002<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

\u56fe3: SkyLake \u7684TLB \u914d\u7f6e\u3002\u6ce8\u610f\u8fd9\u91cc\u7684partition \u4fe1\u606f\u53ef\u80fd\u4e0d\u51c6\u786e\u3002<\/p>\n

3.3 \u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb<\/p>\n

\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u4e3b\u8981\u624b\u6bb5\u662f\u901a\u8fc7\u653b\u51fb\u9762\u83b7\u53d6\u6570\u636e\uff0c\u63a8\u5bfc\u83b7\u5f97\u63a7\u5236\u6d41\u548c\u6570\u636e\u6d41\u4fe1\u606f\uff0c\u6700\u7ec8\u83b7\u53d6\u88abenclave\u7684\u4ee3\u7801\u548c\u6570\u636e\u7684\u4fe1\u606f\uff0c\u6bd4\u5982\u52a0\u5bc6\u5bc6\u94a5\uff0c\u9690\u79c1\u6570\u636e\u7b49\u7b49\u3002\u6211\u4eec\u8fd9\u91cc\u4e0d\u4e00\u4e00\u5217\u4e3e\u5177\u4f53\u7684\u5de5\u4f5c\uff0c\u800c\u662f\u8bd5\u56fe\u4ece\u653b\u51fb\u9762\u7684\u89d2\u5ea6\uff0c\u5168\u9762\u7684\u4ecb\u7ecd\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u3002\u672c\u7ae0\u8282\u4e0b\u9762\u7684\u5185\u5bb9\uff0c\u5c31\u4ece\u5178\u578b\u7684\u653b\u51fb\u9762\uff0c\u5305\u62ec\u9875\u8868\uff0cTLB\uff0ccache\uff0cDRAM \u4ee5\u53caCPU \u5185\u90e8\u7ed3\u6784\uff0c\u63cf\u8ff0\u76ee\u524d\u5df2\u77e5\u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u3002<\/p>\n

3.3.1 \u57fa\u4e8e\u9875\u8868\u7684\u653b\u51fb<\/p>\n

\u6700\u65e9\u7684SGX \u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u5c31\u662f\u57fa\u4e8e\u9875\u8868\u7684\u653b\u51fb[29, 27]\u3002\u8fd9\u7c7b\u5229\u7528\u9875\u8868\u5bf9enclave \u9875\u9762\u7684\u8bbf\u95ee\u63a7\u5236\u6743\uff0c\u8bbe\u7f6eenclave \u9875\u9762\u4e3a\u4e0d\u53ef\u8bbf\u95ee\u3002\u8fd9\u4e2a\u65f6\u5019\u4efb\u4f55\u8bbf\u95ee\u90fd\u4f1a\u89e6\u53d1\u7f3a\u9875\u5f02\u5e38\uff0c\u4ece\u800c\u80fd\u591f\u533a\u5206enclave \u8bbf\u95ee\u4e86\u54ea\u4e9b\u9875\u9762\u3002\u6309\u7167\u65f6\u95f4\u987a\u5e8f\u628a\u8fd9\u4e9b\u4fe1\u606f\u7ec4\u5408\uff0c\u5c31\u80fd\u591f\u53cd\u63a8\u51faenclave \u7684\u67d0\u4e9b\u72b6\u6001\u548c\u4fdd\u62a4\u7684\u6570\u636e\u3002\u8be5\u7c7b\u5178\u578b\u7684\u653b\u51fb\u5305\u62eccontrolled-channel attack [29] \u548cpigeonholeattack [27]\u3002\u8fd9\u7c7b\u653b\u51fb\u7684\u7f3a\u70b9\u5c31\u662f\u7cbe\u5ea6\u53ea\u80fd\u8fbe\u5230\u9875\u7c92\u5ea6\uff0c\u65e0\u6cd5\u533a\u5206\u66f4\u7ec6\u7c92\u5ea6\u7684\u4fe1\u606f\u3002\u4f46\u662f\u5728\u67d0\u4e9b\u573a\u666f\u4e0b\uff0c\u8fd9\u7c7b\u653b\u51fb\u5df2\u7ecf\u80fd\u591f\u83b7\u5f97\u5927\u91cf\u6709\u7528\u4fe1\u606f\u3002\u4f8b\u5982\u56fe4\u6240\u793a\uff0c\u8fd9\u7c7b\u57fa\u4e8e\u9875\u8868\u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u53ef\u4ee5\u83b7\u5f97libjpeg \u5904\u7406\u7684\u56fe\u7247\u4fe1\u606f.\u7ecf\u8fc7\u8fd8\u539f\uff0c\u57fa\u672c\u4e0a\u8fbe\u5230\u4eba\u773c\u8bc6\u522b\u7684\u7a0b\u5ea6\u3002pigeonhole \u653b\u51fb\u4e5f\u5c55\u793a\u4e86\u5927\u91cf\u5bf9\u73b0\u6709\u7684\u5b89\u5168\u5e93\u7684\u653b\u51fb\uff0c\u5982\u56fe5\u6240\u793a\u3002<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

\u56fe4: Controlled-channel \u653b\u51fb\u5bf9libjpeg \u7684\u653b\u51fb\u6548\u679c\u3002<\/p>\n

\u540e\u6765\uff0c\u57fa\u4e8e\u9875\u8868\u7684\u653b\u51fb\u6709\u4e86\u65b0\u7684\u53d8\u79cd\u3002\u8fd9\u4e9b\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u4e3b\u8981\u5229\u7528\u9875\u8868\u7684\u72b6\u6001\u4f4d[28]\u3002\u5982\u56fe6\u6240\u793a\uff0c\u4e00\u4e2a\u9875\u8868\u9879\u6709\u5f88\u591a\u4f4d\uff0c\u6709\u4e9b\u662f\u7528\u6765\u505a\u8bbf\u95ee\u63a7\u5236\uff0c\u6bd4\u5982P, RW, US, XD\uff0c\u6709\u4e9b\u5219\u6807\u8bc6\u72b6\u6001\uff0c\u6bd4\u5982D\uff08dirty bit\uff09\u548cA\uff08accessbit\uff09\u3002\u5982\u679cA bit \u88ab\u8bbe\u7f6e\uff0c\u5219\u8868\u660e\u8be5\u9875\u8868\u9879\u6307\u5411\u7684\u9875\u9762\u5df2\u7ecf\u88ab\u8bbf\u95ee\uff1b\u5982\u679cDbit\u88ab\u8bbe\u7f6e\uff0c\u5219\u8868\u660e\u8be5\u9875\u8868\u9879\u6307\u5411\u7684\u9875\u9762\u53d1\u751f\u4e86\u5199\u64cd\u4f5c\u3002\u901a\u8fc7\u76d1\u63a7\u89c2\u5bdf\u8fd9\u4e9b\u72b6\u6001\u4f4d\uff0c\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u5c31\u53ef\u4ee5\u83b7\u53d6\u548ccontrolled-channel\/pigeonhole \u653b\u51fb\u7c7b\u4f3c\u7684\u4fe1\u606f\u3002<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

\u56fe5: Pigeonhole \u653b\u51fb\u5bf9\u5b89\u5168\u5e93\u7684\u653b\u51fb\u6548\u679c\u3002<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

\u56fe6: \u5178\u578b\u7684\u9875\u8868\u9879\u7684\u683c\u5f0f\uff08x64 \u7cfb\u7edf\uff09\u3002\u5176\u4e2dD \u6807\u8bc6dirty\uff0cA \u6807\u8bc6Access\u3002<\/p>\n

3.3.2 \u57fa\u4e8eTLB \u7684\u653b\u51fb<\/p>\n

\u76ee\u524d\u8fd8\u6ca1\u6709\u5b8c\u5168\u57fa\u4e8eTLB \u7684\u653b\u51fb\uff0c\u4f46\u662f\u5df2\u7ecf\u51fa\u73b0TLB \u4f5c\u4e3a\u8f85\u52a9\u624b\u6bb5\u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\uff0c\u6211\u4eec\u4f1a\u5728\u6df7\u5408\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u7684\u7ae0\u82823.3.6\u91cc\u9762\u4ecb\u7ecd\u3002\u5173\u4e8eTLB\u7684\u4e24\u70b9\u91cd\u8981\u4fe1\u606f\uff0c\u6211\u4eec\u9700\u8981\u4e86\u89e3\uff0c\u5e0c\u671b\u5bf9\u63d0\u51fa\u65b0\u7684\u57fa\u4e8eTLB \u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u548c\u9632\u5fa1\u6709\u6240\u5e2e\u52a9\u30021. TLB \u7684\u5c42\u6b21\u7ed3\u6784\u3002\u76ee\u524dSkyLake \u7684\u673a\u5668\uff0c\u5206\u4e3aL1 \u548cL2 \u4e24\u5c42\u3002\u4e0d\u540c\u5c42\u6b21\u51fa\u73b0\u7684TLB miss \u7684\u65f6\u95f4\u4ee3\u4ef7\u4e0d\u540c\u3002<\/p>\n

2. TLB \u5bf9\u4ee3\u7801\u548c\u6570\u636e\u7684\u533a\u5206\u3002L1 \u533a\u5206\u4ee3\u7801\uff08iTLB\uff09\u548c\u6570\u636e\uff08dTLB\uff09\u3002\u4e24\u8005\u76f4\u63a5\u6709cache coherence \u7684\u4fdd\u8bc1\u3002L2 \u4e0d\u533a\u5206\u4ee3\u7801\u548c\u6570\u636e\u3002<\/p>\n

3.3.3 \u57fa\u4e8eCache \u7684\u653b\u51fb<\/p>\n

\u4f20\u7edf\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u6709\u5f88\u591a\u57fa\u4e8ecache \u7684\u653b\u51fb[19, 30, 17, 10, 11]. \u5728SGX\u7684\u73af\u5883\u91cc\u9762\uff0c\u8fd9\u4e9b\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u6280\u672f\u4ecd\u7136\u9002\u7528\uff0c\u800c\u4e14\u53ef\u4ee5\u505a\u7684\u66f4\u597d\u3002\u539f\u56e0\u5728\u4e8e\uff0c\u5728SGX \u73af\u5883\u91cc\u9762\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u53ef\u4ee5\u63a7\u5236\u6574\u4e2a\u7cfb\u7edf\u7684\u8d44\u6e90\u3002\u56e0\u6b64\uff0c\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u53ef\u4ee5\u6709\u9488\u5bf9\u6027\u5730\u8c03\u5ea6\u8d44\u6e90\uff0c\u51cf\u5c0f\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u7684\u566a\u97f3\uff0c\u589e\u52a0\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u7684\u6210\u529f\u7387\u3002\u964d\u4f4e\u566a\u97f3\u7684\u7b56\u7565\u5927\u4f53\u53ef\u4ee5\u6709\u4ee5\u4e0b\u51e0\u79cd[8, 21, 1, 25]\uff1a<\/p>\n

1. Core Isolation(\u6838\u9694\u79bb)\u3002\u8fd9\u4e2a\u65b9\u6cd5\u7684\u4e3b\u8981\u76ee\u6807\u5c31\u662f\u8ba9enclave \u72ec\u81ea\u5360\u6709\u4e00\u4e2a\u6838\uff08\u4e0d\u5141\u8bb8\u5176\u4ed6\u7a0b\u5e8f\u8fd0\u884c\u5728\u8be5\u6838\u4e0a\u9762\uff09\u3002<\/p>\n

2. Cache Isolation(\u7f13\u5b58\u9694\u79bb)\u3002\u5c3d\u91cf\u4f7f\u7528L1 \u6216\u8005L2 \u7ea7\u522b\u7684cache \u8fdb\u884c\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u3002L3 \u7684cache \u88ab\u6240\u6709\u7684\u6838\u5171\u7528\uff0c\u4f1a\u5f15\u5165\u4e0d\u5fc5\u8981\u7684\u566a\u97f3\u3002<\/p>\n

3. Uninterupted Execution\uff08\u4e0d\u95f4\u65ad\u8fd0\u884c\uff09\u3002\u4e5f\u5c31\u662f\u4e0d\u89e6\u53d1\u6216\u5c3d\u91cf\u5c11\u89e6\u53d1AEX\uff0c\u56e0\u4e3aAEX \u548c\u540e\u7eed\u7684ISR\uff08interrupt sevice rountine) \u90fd\u4f1a\u4f7f\u7528cache\uff0c\u4ece\u800c\u5f15\u5165\u4e0d\u5fc5\u8981\u566a\u97f3\u3002\u5c11\u89e6\u53d1AEX \u5c31\u662f\u8981\u4f7f\u7528\u4e2d\u65ad\u7ed1\u5b9a\uff08interrupt affinity\uff09\u548c\u5c06\u65f6\u949f\u9891\u7387\u3002\u4e0d\u89e6\u53d1AEX \u57fa\u672c\u4e0a\u5c31\u662f\u8ba9\u7cfb\u7edf\u8f6f\u4ef6\uff08\u6bd4\u5982OS\uff09\u5c4f\u853d\u6240\u6709\u4e2d\u65ad\u3002<\/p>\n

\u9664\u4e86\u964d\u4f4e\u566a\u97f3\uff0c\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u8fd8\u53ef\u4ee5\u63d0\u9ad8\u653b\u51fb\u7684\u7cbe\u5ea6\uff0c\u5927\u4f53\u7b56\u7565\u6709\uff1a<\/p>\n

1.\u9ad8\u7cbe\u5ea6\u65f6\u949f\u3002\u53ef\u4ee5\u91c7\u7528APIC \u63d0\u4f9b\u7684\u9ad8\u7cbe\u5ea6\u65f6\u949f\u548c\u786c\u4ef6TSC\u3002<\/p>\n

2. \u653e\u5927\u65f6\u95f4\u5dee\u5f02\u3002\u6bd4\u5982\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u53ef\u4ee5\u914d\u7f6e\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u4ee3\u7801\u6240\u5728\u7684CPU \u4ee5\u6700\u9ad8\u9891\u7387\u8fd0\u884c\uff0c\u800c\u5bf9enclave \u6240\u5728\u7684CPU \u8fdb\u884c\u964d\u9891\u5904\u7406\u3002<\/p>\n

\u57fa\u4e8ecache \u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u53ef\u4ee5\u8fdb\u884c\u7ec6\u7c92\u5ea6\u7684\u76d1\u63a7\u3002\u6700\u5c0f\u7c92\u5ea6\u53ef\u4ee5\u505a\u5230\u4e00\u4e2acache line\uff0c\u537364 \u4e2a\u5b57\u8282\u3002\u7531\u4e8e\u7c92\u5ea6\u66f4\u5c0f\uff0c\u57fa\u4e8ecache \u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u53ef\u4ee5\u6bd4\u57fa\u4e8e\u9875\u8868\u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\uff08\u4ee5\u53ca\u540e\u9762\u4ecb\u7ecd\u7684\u57fa\u4e8eDRAM \u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\uff09\u83b7\u5f97\u66f4\u591a\u7684\u4fe1\u606f\u3002<\/p>\n

3.3.4 \u57fa\u4e8eDRAM \u7684\u653b\u51fb<\/p>\n

\u5728\u8bb2\u89e3\u57fa\u4e8eDRAM \u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u4e4b\u524d\uff0c\u6211\u4eec\u9996\u5148\u4e86\u89e3\u4e00\u4e9bDRAM \u7684\u57fa\u672c\u77e5\u8bc6\u3002DRAM \u4e00\u822c\u7531channel\uff0cDIMM, rank, bank \u7b49\u90e8\u5206\u6784\u6210\uff0c\u5982\u56fe7\u6240\u793a\u3002\u6bcf\u4e2abank \u53c8\u6709columns \u548crows \u7ec4\u6210\u3002\u6bcf\u4e2abank\u91cc\u9762\u8fd8\u6709\u4e00\u4e2arow buffer \u7528\u6765\u7f13\u5b58\u6700\u8fd1\u8bbf\u95ee\u8fc7\u7684\u4e00\u4e2arow\u3002\u5728\u8bbf\u95eeDRAM \u7684\u65f6\u5019\uff0c\u5982\u679c\u8bbf\u95ee\u5730\u5740\u5df2\u7ecf\u88ab\u7f13\u5b58\u5728row buffer \u5f53\u4e2d\uff08\u60c5\u51b5A\uff09\uff0c\u5c31\u76f4\u63a5\u4ecebuffer \u91cc\u9762\u8bfb\u53d6\uff0c\u5426\u5219\u9700\u8981\u628a\u8bbf\u95ee\u5730\u5740\u5bf9\u5e94\u7684\u6574\u4e2arow \u90fd\u52a0\u8f7d\u5230row buffer \u5f53\u4e2d\uff08\u60c5\u51b5B\uff09\u3002\u5f53\u7136\uff0c\u5982\u679crow buffer \u4e4b\u524d\u7f13\u5b58\u4e86\u5176\u4ed6row \u7684\u5185\u5bb9\uff0c\u8fd8\u9700\u8981\u5148\u6362\u51farow buffer \u7684\u5185\u5bb9\u518d\u52a0\u8f7d\u65b0\u7684row\uff08\u60c5\u51b5C\uff09\u3002A\u3001B\u3001C \u5bf9\u5e94\u7684\u4e09\u79cd\u60c5\u51b5\uff0c\u8bbf\u95ee\u901f\u5ea6\u4f9d\u6b21\u9012\u51cf\uff08\u60c5\u51b5A \u6700\u5feb\uff0c\u60c5\u51b5C \u6700\u6162\uff09\u3002\u8fd9\u6837\uff0c\u901a\u8fc7\u65f6\u95f4\u4e0a\u7684\u5dee\u5f02\uff0c\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u5c31\u53ef\u4ee5\u4e86\u89e3\u5f53\u524d\u8bbf\u95ee\u7684\u5185\u5b58\u5730\u5740\u662f\u5426\u5728row buffer \u91cc\u9762\uff0c\u4ee5\u53ca\u662f\u5426\u6709\u88ab\u6362\u51fa\u3002\u6587\u7ae0[25] \u5728\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u8fc7\u7a0b\u4e2d\u7528\u5230\u4e86\u57fa\u4e8eDRAM \u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u4fe1\u606f\u3002\u53e6\u5916\u6587\u7ae0[23] \u4ecb\u7ecd\u4e86\u66f4\u591a\u57fa\u4e8eDRAM \u7684\u653b\u51fb\u7ec6\u8282\uff0c\u4e0d\u8fc7\u8be5\u6587\u7ae0\u4e0d\u662f\u5728SGX \u73af\u5883\u4e0b\u7684\u653b\u51fb\u3002<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

\u56fe7: \u5178\u578b\u7684DRAM \u7684\u683c\u5f0f\u3002DRAM \u6839\u636e\u7269\u7406\u5730\u5740\u9009\u62e9channel\uff0cDIMM,rank, bank, \u4ee5\u53carow \u548ccolumn\u3002<\/p>\n

\u57fa\u4e8eDRAM \u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u6709\u4e00\u4e9b\u4e0d\u8db3[28]\u3002\u7b2c\u4e00\uff0cenclave \u4f7f\u7528\u7684\u5185\u5b58\u901a\u5e38\u90fd\u5728\u7f13\u5b58\u91cc\u9762\uff0c\u53ea\u6709\u5c11\u90e8\u5206\u9700\u8981\u4eceDRAM \u91cc\u9762\u53bb\u53d6\u3002\u7b2c\u4e8c\uff0cDRAM\u7684\u7cbe\u5ea6\u4e0d\u591f\u3002\u4f8b\u5982\uff0c\u4e00\u4e2a\u9875\u9762\uff084KB) \u901a\u5e38\u5206\u5e03\u57284 \u4e2aDRAM row \u4e0a\u9762\u3002\u8fd9\u6837\uff0c\u57fa\u4e8eDRAM \u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u7684\u7cbe\u5ea6\u5c31\u662f1KB\u3002\u4ec5\u4ec5\u6bd4\u57fa\u4e8e\u9875\u8868\u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u597d\u4e00\u4e9b\uff0c\u8fdc\u8fdc\u4e0d\u53ca\u57fa\u4e8ecache \u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u7684\u7cbe\u5ea6\u3002\u7b2c\u4e09\uff0cDRAM\u91cc\u9762\u5b58\u5728\u5f88\u96be\u907f\u514d\u7684\u566a\u97f3\u5e72\u6270\uff0c\u56e0\u4e3a\u4e00\u4e2aDRAM row \u88ab\u5f88\u591a\u9875\u9762\u4f7f\u7528\uff0c\u540c\u65f6\u540c\u4e00\u4e2abank \u4e0d\u540crow\u7684\u6570\u636e\u8bfb\u53d6\u4e5f\u4f1a\u5bf9\u65f6\u95f4\u6d4b\u91cf\u9020\u6210\u5e72\u6270\uff0c\u4f7f\u5f97\u8bef\u62a5\u65f6\u5e38\u53d1\u751f\u3002<\/p>\n

3.3.5 \u57fa\u4e8eCPU \u5185\u90e8\u7ed3\u6784\u7684\u653b\u51fb<\/p>\n

CPU \u5185\u90e8\u6709\u5927\u91cf\u7684\u7ed3\u6784\u662f\u5728enclave \u548cnon-enclave \u4e4b\u95f4\u5171\u7528\u7684\u3002\u8fd9\u5c31\u7ed9\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u63d0\u4f9b\u4e86\u5927\u91cf\u7684\u653b\u51fb\u9762\u7d20\u6750\u3002\u6bd4\u5982\u6587\u7ae0[16] \u91cc\u9762\u63d0\u51fa\u4f7f\u7528BPB\uff08Branch Prediction Buffer\uff09\u6765\u5b9e\u73b0\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u3002\u5177\u4f53\u6765\u8bb2\uff0c\u5728enclave \u548cnon-enclave \u5207\u6362\u7684\u65f6\u5019\uff0cBPB ??\u5b58\u7559\u7684\u8df3\u8f6c\u9884\u6d4b\u8bb0\u5f55\u5e76\u6ca1\u6709\u88ab\u6e05\u9664\u3002\u8fd9\u6837\u4f7f\u5f97non-enclave \u53ef\u4ee5\u6784\u9020\u4e00\u4e2a\u7a0b\u5e8f\uff0c\u6d4b\u8bd5\u8fd9\u4e9b\u8df3\u8f6c\u9884\u6d4b\u8bb0\u5f55\u3002\u5982\u679c\u9884\u6d4b\u6210\u529f\uff0c\u5219\u6267\u884c\u65f6\u95f4\u8f83\u77ed\u3002\u53cd\u4e4b\uff0c\u5982\u679c\u9884\u6d4b\u5931\u8d25\uff0c\u5219\u6267\u884c\u65f6\u95f4\u8f83\u957f\u3002\u901a\u8fc7\u65f6\u95f4\u4e0a\u7684\u5dee\u5f02\uff0c\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u5c31\u53ef\u4ee5\u63a8\u6d4benclave \u4e4b\u524d\u8fd0\u884c\u7684\u8df3\u8f6c\u5206\u652f\uff0c\u8fdb\u800c\u83b7\u5f97enclave \u8fd0\u884c\u7684\u63a7\u5236\u6d41\u56fe\u3002\u901a\u8fc7\u63a7\u5236\u6d41\u56fe\uff0c\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u53c8\u53ef\u4ee5\u8fdb\u4e00\u6b65\u63a8\u6d4b\u9690\u79c1\u6570\u636e\uff0c\u6bd4\u5982\u52a0\u5bc6\u5bc6\u94a5\u7b49\u3002\u8fd9\u4e2a\u653b\u51fb\u7684\u5f3a\u5927\u4e4b\u5904\u5728\u4e8e\u4ed6\u51e0\u4e4e\u53ef\u4ee5\u8fd8\u539f\u6574\u4e2a\u63a7\u5236\u6d41\u3002\u8fd9\u6837\u7ec6\u7c92\u5ea6\u7684\u4fe1\u606f\u4f7f\u5f97\u8be5\u653b\u51fb\u53ef\u4ee5\u6cc4\u9732\u5f88\u591a\u4fe1\u606f\u3002\u6587\u7ae0\u4e5f\u8fdb\u884c\u4e86\u5927\u91cf\u5b9e\u9a8c\uff0c\u5145\u5206\u5c55\u793a\u4e86\u8fd9\u4e2a\u653b\u51fb\u7684\u5f3a\u5927\u3002\u5b9e\u9a8c\u8868\u660e\uff0c\u8fd9\u4e2a\u653b\u51fb\u53ef\u4ee5\u6cc4\u9732\u5b57\u7b26\u4e32\u4fe1\u606f\uff0cRSA \u79c1\u94a5\u4ee5\u53ca\u7f51\u7edc\u6570\u636e\u7b49\u7b49\u3002<\/p>\n

\u76ee\u524d\u5bf9\u4ee5CPU \u5185\u90e8\u7ed3\u6784\u4e3a\u653b\u51fb\u9762\u7684\u5de5\u4f5c\u624d\u521a\u521a\u5f00\u59cb\uff0c\u4ec5\u4ec5\u6709\u4e00\u4e2a\u5de5\u4f5c\u53d1\u8868\u3002\u76f8\u4fe1\u901a\u8fc7\u8fdb\u4e00\u6b65\u7814\u7a76\uff0c\u8fd8\u4f1a\u6709\u5176\u4ed6\u7684\u653b\u51fb\u9762\u88ab\u9646\u7eed\u53d1\u6398\u3002<\/p>\n

\u4ece\u8bbe\u8ba1\u4e0a\u6765\u8bb2\uff0cSGX \u53ef\u4ee5\u907f\u514d\u8fd9\u7c7b\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u3002\u5177\u4f53\u6765\u8bb2\uff0c\u5728enclave\u5230non-enclave \u7684\u5207\u6362\u8fc7\u7a0b\u4e2d\uff0cCPU \u6e05\u9664\u8fd9\u4e9b\u5171?\u7684\u5185\u90e8\u7ed3\u6784\u4f53\u3002\u8fd9\u6837\uff0cnon-enclave \u5c31\u4e0d\u4f1a\u5f97\u5230\u4efb\u4f55\u6b8b\u7559\u7684\u8bb0\u5f55\u3002\u4f46\u5728\u5177\u4f53\u5b9e\u73b0\u7684\u65f6\u5019\uff0c\u8fd8\u8981\u6ce8\u610f\u4e00\u4e9b\u7ec6\u8282\uff0c\u6bd4\u5982\u6e05\u9664\u7684\u65f6\u95f4\u4e5f\u5fc5\u987b\u662f\u7a33\u5b9a\u4e0d\u53d8\u7684\u3002\u5982\u679cenclave \u8fd0\u884c\u7684\u5dee\u5f02\u4f1a\u5bfc\u81f4\u6e05\u9664\u64cd\u4f5c\u7684\u65f6\u95f4\u5dee\u5f02\uff0c\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u5f88\u53ef\u80fd\u636e\u6b64\u63a8\u5bfc\u51faenclave \u7684\u67d0\u4e9b\u8fd0\u884c\u72b6\u6001\u3002<\/p>\n

3.3.6 \u6df7\u5408\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb<\/p>\n

\u6df7\u5408\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u662f\uff081\uff09\u540c\u65f6\u91c7\u96c6\u591a\u4e2a\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u9762\u7684\u4fe1\u606f\uff0c\u6216\uff082\uff09\u901a\u8fc7\u591a\u4e2a\u653b\u51fb\u9762\u5171\u540c\u4f5c\u7528\u653e\u5927\u5dee\u5f02\u589e\u52a0\u51c6\u786e\u5ea6\u3002\u6bd4\u8f83\u5178\u578b\u7684\u505a\u6cd5\u5305\u62ec\uff1a1. TLB \u548c\u9875\u8868\u6df7\u5408\u653b\u51fb\u3002\u6bd4\u5982TLB miss \u7684\u65f6\u5019\u4f1a\u52a0\u8f7d\u9875\u8868\uff0c\u8fd9\u4e2a\u65f6\u5019CPU \u4f1a\u8bbe\u7f6e\u9875\u8868\u7684Access bit\u3002\u6587\u7ae0[28] \u5c31\u5728hyperthreading \u7684\u60c5\u51b5\u4e0b\uff0c\u89e6\u53d1\u5927\u91cf\u7684TLB miss\uff0c\u518d\u901a\u8fc7\u89c2\u5bdf\u9875\u8868\u7684A bit \u8fdb\u884c\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u3002<\/p>\n

2. Cache \u548cDRAM \u6df7\u5408\u653b\u51fb\u3002\u57fa\u4e8eDRAM \u7684\u653b\u51fb\u53ea\u80fd\u7cbe\u786e\u5230row\uff08\u4e00\u4e2arow \u901a\u5e388KB\uff09\u7684\u7c92\u5ea6\u3002\u4e3a\u4e86\u589e\u5f3a\u8fd9\u7c7b\u653b\u51fb\u6548\u679c\uff0c\u6587\u7ae0[28] \u63d0\u51fa\u4e86\u8fd9\u4e2acache-DRAM \u653b\u51fb\u6765\u589e\u52a0\u7a7a\u95f4\u7cbe\u5ea6\uff0c\u628a\u7cbe\u5ea6\u63d0\u9ad8\u5230\u4e86\u4e00\u4e2acache line\uff0864B\uff09\u3002<\/p>\n

\u9664\u4e86\u7ed3\u5408\u4e24\u4e2a\u653b\u51fb\u9762\u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\uff0c\u8fd8\u53ef\u4ee5\u91c7\u7528\u591a\u4e2a\u653b\u51fb\u9762\u76f8\u7ed3\u5408\u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u3002\u8fd9\u7c7b\u6df7\u5408\u653b\u51fb\u6211\u8fd8\u6ca1\u6709\u5728SGX \u7684\u73af\u5883\u4e0b\u9762\u770b\u5230\u76f8\u5173\u5de5\u4f5c\u3002\u4e0d\u8fc7\u4e4b\u524dCCS\u201816 \u7684\u6587\u7ae0[9]\uff0c\u4f7f\u7528\u4e86\u4e09\u4e2a\u653b\u51fb\u9762\uff08i.e., TLB\u3001\u9875\u8868\u548ccache\uff09\u7684\u6df7\u5408\u3002\u6211\u76f8\u4fe1\u7c7b\u4f3c\u7684\u653b\u51fb\u4e5f\u53ef\u4ee5\u5728SGX \u7684\u73af\u5883\u4e0b\u4f7f\u7528\u3002<\/p>\n

3.4 \u672a\u6765\u53ef\u80fd\u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb<\/p>\n

\u672a\u6765\u65b0\u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u53ef\u80fd\u6765\u81ea\u4e24\u4e2a\u65b9\u9762\u3002\u7b2c\u4e00\u5c31\u662f\u53d1\u6398\u65b0\u7684\u6df7\u5408\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u3002\u524d\u9762\u5217\u51fa\u7684\u7ecf\u5178\u7684\u6df7\u5408\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\uff0c\u4ed6\u4eec\u5f80\u5f80\u4f7f\u7528\u4e24\u79cd\u653b\u51fb\u9762\u4fe1\u606f\u3002\u56e0\u6b64\uff0c\u6211\u4eec\u53ef\u4ee5\u8003\u8651\u591a\u4e2a\u653b\u51fb\u9762\u7ed3\u5408\u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u3002\u4ee5\u5f80\u7684\u6df7\u5408\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u5f80\u5f80\u4e13\u6ce8\u4e8e\u5185\u5b58\u7ba1\u7406\u548c\u5730\u5740\u8f6c\u6362\u7b49\u65b9\u9762\uff0c\u65b0\u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u53ef\u4ee5\u7ed3\u5408\u5176\u4ed6\u65b9\u9762\u7684\u4fe1\u606f\uff0c\u8fdb\u884c\u4e00\u4e9b\u65b0\u7684\u5c1d\u8bd5\u3002<\/p>\n

Enclave \u6240\u6709\u548cnon-enclave \u5171\u4eab\u7684\u8d44\u6e90\u90fd\u53ef\u80fd\u6210\u4e3a\u6f5c\u5728\u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u9762\u3002\u56e0\u6b64\uff0c\u53d1\u6398\u65b0\u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u7684\u7b2c\u4e8c\u4e2a\u9014\u5f84\u5c31\u662f\u53d1\u73b0\u65b0\u7684\u5171\u4eab\u8d44\u6e90\uff0c\u6bd4\u5982\u672a\u88ab\u53d1\u6398\u7684CPU \u5185\u90e8\u5171\u4eab\u7ed3\u6784\u3002\u8fd9\u4e9b\u65b0\u7684\u7684\u5171\u4eab\u8d44\u6e90\u53ef\u80fd\u6765\u81ea\u4e00\u4e9b\u65b0\u7684\u786c\u4ef6\u7279\u6027\uff0c\u6bd4\u5982Intel PT, Intel TSX, Intel MPX, Intel CAT \u7b49\u7b49\u3002<\/p>\n

4 \u53ef\u80fd\u7684\u9632\u5fa1\u65b9\u6cd5<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u76ee\u524d\u5df2\u7ecf\u6709\u5f88\u591a\u6587\u7ae0\u7ed9\u51fa\u4e86\u9632\u5fa1SGX \u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u7684\u65b9\u6848\uff0c\u6709\u4e9b\u53ea\u662f\u5927\u4f53\u7684\u601d\u8def\uff0c\u6709\u4e9b\u5219\u5df2\u7ecf\u6709\u6210\u578b\u7684\u8bbe\u8ba1\u548c\u5b9e\u73b0\u3002\u6211\u4eec\u5728\u8fd9\u91cc\u4e3b\u8981\u4ecb\u7ecd\u9632\u5fa1\u7684\u601d\u8def\u548c\u65b9\u6cd5\uff0c\u4e0d\u6d89\u53ca\u8bbe\u8ba1\u548c\u5b9e\u73b0\u7684\u7ec6\u8282\u3002\u9996\u5148\uff0c\u6211\u4eec\u628a\u8fd9\u4e9b\u65b9\u6cd5\u6d89\u53ca\u7684\u5c42\u6b21\uff0c\u5206\u4e3a\u6e90\u7801\u7ea7\u522b\uff0c\u7cfb\u7edf\u7ea7\u522b\u548c\u786c\u4ef6\u7ea7\u522b\u3002<\/p>\n

4.1 \u6e90\u7801\u5c42\u6b21\u7684\u89e3\u51b3\u65b9\u6848<\/p>\n

\u8fd9\u7c7b\u65b9\u6cd5\u7684\u4e3b\u8981\u601d\u60f3\u5c31\u662f\u901a\u8fc7\u4fee\u6539\u6e90\u7801\uff0c\u7f16\u5199\u51fa\u80fd\u591f\u9632\u5fa1\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u7684\u4ee3\u7801\u5b9e\u73b0\u3002\u8fd9\u91cc\u7684\u6838\u5fc3\u601d\u60f3\u5c31\u662f\u9690\u85cf\u63a7\u5236\u6d41\u548c\u6570\u636e\u6d41\u3002<\/p>\n

\u8fd9\u7c7b\u65b9\u6cd5\u7684\u63a2\u7d22\u5df2\u7ecf\u5728\u4e00\u4e9b\u5bc6\u7801\u7b97\u6cd5\u4e2d\u6709\u6240\u6d89\u53ca\u3002\u6bd4\u5982\u5229\u7528exponentblinding [15] \u6765\u589e\u5f3aRSA \u7b97\u6cd5\uff0c\u5229\u7528bit slicing \u589e\u5f3aDES \u548cAES\u65b9\u6cd5[3, 20]\u3002\u5728\u673a\u5668\u5b66\u4e60\u9886\u57df\uff0c\u4e5f\u6709\u4eba\u505a\u4e86\u5c1d\u8bd5\u3002Oblivious ML\u6587\u7ae0[22]\u4fee\u6539\u4e86\u673a\u5668\u5b66\u4e60\u7684\u7b97\u6cd5\uff0c\u4f7f\u7528oblivious assignments and comparisons\u6765\u9690\u85cf\u63a7\u5236\u6d41\uff0c\u4f7f\u7528oblivious array access\uff08\u5373k-anonymity\uff09\u6765\u9690\u85cf\u6570\u636e\u6d41\u3002\u6587\u7ae0Raccoon [24] \u4e5f\u91c7\u7528\u4e86\u7c7b\u4f3c\u7684\u65b9\u6cd5\uff0c\u4f7f\u7528oblivious store \u9690\u85cfif-else \u63a7\u5236\u6d41\uff0c\u4f7f\u7528ORAM \u6765\u9690\u85cf\u6570\u636e\u6d41\uff0c\u4ece\u800c\u62b5\u5fa1\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u3002\u4f46\u662f\u76ee\u524d\u8fd9\u4e9b\u6280\u672f\u8fd8\u5f88\u96be\u5728\u4e00\u4e2a\u901a\u7528\u7684\u8ba1\u7b97\u73af\u5883\u4e0b\u5b9e\u73b0\uff0c\u6bd4\u5982loop trip count\uff0clong jump \u4ee5\u53cabreak \u7b49\u95ee\u9898\u3002<\/p>\n

4.2 \u7cfb\u7edf\u5c42\u6b21\u7684\u89e3\u51b3\u65b9\u6848<\/p>\n

\u7cfb\u7edf\u5c42\u6b21\u7684\u89e3\u51b3\u65b9\u6848\u4e3b\u8981\u662f\u5229\u7528\u4e00\u4e9b\u7cfb\u7edf\u7279\u6027\u6765\u9632\u5fa1\u6216\u68c0\u6d4bSGX \u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u3002\u8fd9\u91cc\u6709\u51e0\u4e2a\u601d\u8def\u53ef\u4ee5\u53c2\u8003\uff1a<\/p>\n

1. \u968f\u673a\u5316\u6280\u672f\uff08Randomization\uff09\u3002\u968f\u673a\u5316\u6280\u672f\u53ef\u4ee5\u5e94\u7528\u5728\u63a7\u5236\u6d41\u548c\u6570\u636e\u6d41\u4e0a\u9762\uff0c\u8fd9\u5c06\u5927\u5927\u589e\u52a0\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u7684\u4ee3\u4ef7\u3002\u9632\u5fa1\u6548\u679c\u4e0e\u968f\u673a\u5316\u7c92\u5ea6\uff0c\u4ee5\u53ca\u968f\u673a\u5316\u9891\u7387\u6709\u5173\u3002<\/p>\n

2. \u68c0\u6d4b\u53ef\u7591\u5f02\u5e38\u548c\u4e2d\u65ad\u3002T-SGX [26] \u5229\u7528TSX \u6280\u672f\u6765\u68c0\u6d4b\u4e2d\u65ad\u548c\u7f3a\u9875\u5f02\u5e38\uff0c\u4ece\u800c\u62b5\u5fa1\u6700\u539f\u59cb\u7684controlled-channel \u653b\u51fb[29]\u3002\u4f46\u662f\u73b0\u5728\u5df2\u7ecf\u51fa\u73b0\u4e0d\u9700\u8981\u89e6\u53d1AEX \u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u3002<\/p>\n

3. \u68c0\u6d4b\u65f6\u95f4\u5f02\u5e38\u3002\u76ee\u524dD\u00e9j\u00e1 Vu \u7cfb\u7edf[4] \u4e5f\u4f7f\u7528TSX \u6280\u672f\u6765\u4fdd\u62a4enclave\u81ea\u5df1\u7684\u65f6\u949f\u3002\u5982\u679c\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u4e2d\u65ad\u6216\u51cf\u7f13enclave \u7684\u8fd0\u884c\uff0cenclave\u5c31\u53ef\u4ee5\u901a\u8fc7\u81ea\u5df1\u7684\u65f6\u949f\u68c0\u6d4b\u51fa\u65f6\u95f4\u4e0a\u7684\u5f02\u5e38\u3002\u76ee\u524d\uff0c\u7edd\u5927\u591a\u6570\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u90fd\u4f1a\u5f15\u8d77enclave \u7684\u663e\u8457\u6027\u80fd\u4e0b\u964d\u3002\u56e0\u6b64\uff0c\u68c0\u6d4b\u65f6\u95f4\u5f02\u5e38\u8fd8\u662f\u4e00\u4e2a\u6bd4\u8f83\u6709\u6548\u7684\u65b9\u6848\u3002<\/p>\n

4. Cache \u9694\u79bb\u3002\u76ee\u524dIntel \u63a8\u51fa\u4e86CAT\uff08Cache Allocation Technology\uff09\u6280\u672f\uff0c\u5141\u8bb8\u5bf9cache \u8fdb\u884c\u7c97\u7c92\u5ea6\u7684\u9694\u79bb\u3002\u8fd9\u4e2a\u6280\u672f\u5df2\u7ecf\u88ab\u4f7f\u7528\u5728\u4e91\u8ba1\u7b97\u5e73\u53f0\u4e0a\u9762[18] \u9632\u5fa1\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\uff0c\u4f46\u662f\u8fd8\u6ca1\u6709\u770b\u5230\u5728SGX \u73af\u5883\u91cc\u9762\u7684\u5e94\u7528\u3002\u628aCAT \u5e94\u7528\u5230SGX \u7684\u4e00\u4e2a\u5f88\u5927\u7684\u969c\u788d\u662fenclave\u5728\u7528\u6237\u7a7a\u95f4\u65e0\u6cd5\u6709\u6548\u5730\u68c0\u6d4b\u6216\u9a8c\u8bc1CAT \u7684\u914d\u7f6e\u3002<\/p>\n

4.3 \u786c\u4ef6\u5c42\u6b21\u7684\u89e3\u51b3\u65b9\u6848<\/p>\n

\u786c\u4ef6\u5c42\u6b21\u7684\u89e3\u51b3\u65b9\u6848\u8fd8\u5904\u4e8e\u63a2\u7d22\u9636\u6bb5\u3002\u52a0?\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u9632\u5fa1\uff0c\u5c06\u4f1a\u663e\u8457\u589e\u52a0\u786c\u4ef6\u590d\u6742\u5ea6\uff0c\u5f71\u54cd\u529f\u8017\u548c\u6027\u80fd\u3002\u8fd9\u4e5f\u53ef\u80fd\u662fIntel \u5728\u6700\u521d\u63a8\u51faSGX \u7684\u65f6\u5019\u6ca1\u6709\u52a0\u5165\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u9632\u5fa1\u7684\u4e00\u4e2a\u539f\u56e0\u3002\u786c\u4ef6\u89e3\u51b3\u65b9\u6848\u53ef\u80fd\u6709\u4ee5\u4e0b\u4e24\u79cd\uff1a1. \u786c\u4ef6\u5206\u5272\uff08partition\uff09\u3002\u7c7b\u4f3c\u4e8eARM\u91cc\u9762\u7684trustzone\uff0c\u6709\u81ea\u5df1\u7684cache\uff0cmemory \u7b49\u4e00\u7cfb\u5217\u786c\u4ef6\u8d44\u6e90\uff0c\u7269\u7406\u4e0a\u4e0enon-enclave \u5206\u79bb\u3002<\/p>\n

2. \u786c\u4ef6\u9694\u79bb\uff08isolation\uff09\u3002\u7c7b\u4f3c\u4e8eIntel CAT \u6280\u672f\uff0c\u53ef\u4ee5\u5355\u72ec\u4e3a\u6bcf\u4e00\u4e2aenclave \u63d0\u4f9b\u4e00\u4e2a\u52a8\u6001\u9694\u79bb\u51fa\u7684cache\u3002\u5f53enclave \u9500\u6bc1\u7684\u65f6\u5019\uff0c\u9694\u79bb\u51fa\u7684cache \u53ef\u4ee5\u88ab\u6536\u56de\u3002\u8fd9??\u4e2a\u5f88\u91cd\u8981\u7684\u8981\u6c42\u5c31\u662fenclave \u5fc5\u987b\u53ef\u4ee5\u9a8c\u8bc1\u8fd9\u4e2a\u529f\u80fd\u7684\u6709\u6548\u6027\u3002<\/p>\n

Sanctum [7] \u5df2\u7ecf\u505a\u4e86\u4e00\u4e9b\u5c1d\u8bd5\uff0c\u4f46\u662f\u8fd8\u4e0d\u591f\u5f7b\u5e95\uff0c\u8fd8\u4f1a\u906d\u53d7\u653b\u51fb[1]\u3002<\/p>\n

5 \u603b\u7ed3<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u672c\u6587\u603b\u7ed3\u4e86SGX \u6240\u9762\u4e34\u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\uff0c\u5e76\u5c55\u671b\u4e86\u6f5c\u5728\u7684\u653b\u51fb\u548c\u9632\u5fa1\u65b9\u6cd5\u3002SGX \u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u5341\u5206\u96be\u4ee5\u9632\u5fa1\u3002\u7a76\u5176\u539f\u56e0\u662fSGX \u7684\u5b89\u5168\u5047\u8bbe\u548c\u5e94\u7528\u6a21\u578b\u5141\u8bb8enclave \u548c\u4e0d\u53ef\u4fe1\u7684non-enclave \u5171\u4eab\u5927\u91cf\u7684\u8d44\u6e90\u3002\u8fd9\u4e9b\u5c31\u7ed9\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u4ee5\u5f88\u5927\u7684\u653b\u51fb\u9762\u53bb\u533a\u5206\u65f6\u95f4\u4e0a\u7684\u5dee\u5f02\u548c\u8d44\u6e90\u4f7f\u7528\u7684\u4e0d\u540c\uff0c\u4ece\u800c\u6cc4\u9732enclave \u7684\u63a7\u5236\u6d41\u548c\u6570\u636e\u6d41\u3002\u800c\u4e14\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u62e5\u6709\u7ba1\u7406\u7cfb\u7edf\u8d44\u6e90\u7684\u80fd\u529b\uff0c\u4ece\u800c\u80fd\u591f\u6700\u5927\u7a0b\u5ea6\u4e0a\u51cf\u5c0f\u566a\u97f3\u5e72\u6270\uff0c\u589e\u52a0\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u7684\u6210\u529f\u7387\u3002\u603b\u4e4b\uff0cSGX \u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u662f\u4e00\u4e2a\u5b9e\u7528\u7684\u653b\u51fb\uff0c\u6211\u4eec\u5728\u5b9e\u9645\u90e8\u7f72\u5e94\u7528SGX \u7684\u65f6\u5019\uff0c\u5fc5\u987b\u8003\u8651\u6f5c\u5728\u7684\u4fa7\u4fe1\u9053\u653b\u51fb\u3002<\/p>\n

\u4f5c\u8005\u7b80\u4ecb<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u7a0b\u8d8a\u5f3a\u662f\u767e\u5ea6\u7f8e\u56fd\u7814\u7a76\u9662\u5b89\u5168\u5b9e\u9a8c\u5ba4\u7684\u8d44\u6df1\u5b89\u5168\u79d1\u5b66\u5bb6\u3002\u4ed6\u672c\u79d1\u5c31\u8bfb\u4e8e\u6d59\u6c5f\u5927\u5b66\uff0c\u535a\u58eb\u5728\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u7ba1\u7406\u5927\u5b66\u653b\u8bfb\u4fe1\u606f\u5b89\u5168\u548c\u53ef\u4fe1\u65b9\u5411\u3002\u6bd5\u4e1a\u540e\uff0c\u5148\u540e\u5728\u5361\u5185\u57fa\u6885\u9686\u5927\u5b66CyLab \u5b9e\u9a8c\u5ba4\u548c\u4e09\u661f\u7f8e\u56fd\u7814\u7a76\u9662\u5c31\u804c\uff0c\u4ece\u4e8b\u5b89\u5168\u65b9\u9762\u7684\u7814\u7a76\u5de5\u4f5c\u3002\u4ed6\u7684\u7814\u7a76\u65b9\u5411\u5305\u62ec\u4e91\u5b89\u5168\uff0c\u624b\u673a\u5b89\u5168\uff0c\u53ef\u4fe1\u8ba1\u7b97\uff0c\u4ee5\u53ca\u8f6f\u4ef6\u5b89\u5168\u3002<\/p>\n

\u53c2\u8003\u6587\u732e<\/strong><\/p>\n

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[22] Olga Ohrimenko, Felix Schuster, Cedric Fournet, AasthaMehta, Sebastian Nowozin, Kapil Vaswani, and Manuel Costa.Oblivious multi-party machine learning on trusted processors.In 25th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 16),pages 619\u2013636, Austin, TX, 2016. USENIX Association.<\/p>\n

[23] Peter Pessl, Daniel Gruss, Cl\u00e9mentine Maurice, MichaelSchwarz, and Stefan Mangard. Drama: Exploiting dram ad-dressing for cross-cpu attacks. In 25th USENIX Security Symposium,2016.<\/p>\n

[24] Ashay Rane, Calvin Lin, and Mohit Tiwari. Raccoon: Closingdigital side-channels through obfuscated execution. In 24thUSENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 15), pages431\u2013446, Washington, D.C., 2015. USENIX Association.<\/p>\n

[25] Michael Schwarz, Samuel Weiser, Daniel Gruss, Cl\u00e9mentineMaurice, and Stefan Mangard. Malware guard extension: UsingSGX to conceal cache attacks. CoRR, abs\/1702.08719,2017.<\/p>\n

[26] Ming-Wei Shih, Sangho Lee, Taesoo Kim, and Marcus Peinado.T-sgx: Eradicating controlled-channel attacks against enclaveprograms. In Proceedings of the 2017 Annual Network andDistributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), San Diego,CA, 2017.<\/p>\n

[27] Shweta Shinde, Zheng Leong Chua, Viswesh Narayanan, andPrateek Saxena. Preventing page faults from telling your secrets.In Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conferenceon Computer and Communications Security, ASIA CCS \u201916,pages 317\u2013328, New York, NY, USA, 2016. ACM.<\/p>\n

[28] Wenhao Wang, Guoxing Chen, Xiaorui Pan, Yinqian Zhang,XiaoFeng Wang, Vincent Bindschaedler, Haixu Tang, andCarl A. Gunter. Leaky cauldron on the dark land: Understandingmemory side-channel hazards in SGX. CoRR,abs\/1705.07289, 2017.<\/p>\n

[29] Yuanzhong Xu, Weidong Cui, and Marcus Peinado. Controlledchannelattacks: Deterministic side channels for untrusted operatingsystems. In Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE Symposiumon Security and Privacy, SP \u201915, pages 640\u2013656, Washington,DC, USA, 2015. IEEE Computer Society.<\/p>\n

[30] Yuval Yarom and Katrina Falkner. Flush+reload: A high resolution,low noise, l3 cache side-channel attack. In Proceedingsof the 23rd USENIX Conference on Security Symposium,SEC\u201914, pages 719\u2013732, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2014. USENIXAssociation.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

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 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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